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Abstract 
This article assesses the sources of revenue available to the Adaklu Anyigbe District, examines the strategies for 
revenue mobilisation and evaluates the challenges facing the Adaklu-Anyigbe District in its revenue mobilisation 
efforts. The Assembly has staff strength of about 85 workers including the thirteen (13) Assembly members of 
the District. Thirty-five questionnaires were administered among 35 selected staff and Assembly members of the 
District. It was found out that between 2005 and 2008, the Assembly was unable to achieve its revenue targets. 
Revenue mobilisation fell short of the estimated targets for four consecutive years, this made planning and 
funding of development projects very difficult. The traditional sources of revenue proved unpredictable and 
difficult to mobilise, whilst the citizens were unwilling to pay their basic and special rates due to lack of 
education and inability to pay. It was also found out that the Assembly, as a newly created District, lacked the 
requisite man power and logistics for achieving its revenue generation targets. The research recommends 
capacity building for the District in terms of basic infrastructural support funding and radical staff development 
to enable the Assembly meet its development aspirations. 
Key words: Revenue mobilisation, decentralisation, capacity building, traditional sources of revenue.. 
 
Introduction 
Attempts at decentralisation of government machinery in Ghana since independence have proved ineffective, 
inefficient and problematic.  The reasons often given for this situation have been: 
• Low development capacity of the decentralised areas, not unrelated to size and weak revenue and 
resource base; 
• Lack of technical expertise; 
• Poor financial administration and corruption; 
• Inexperience and poor calibre of local government personnel, attributable in part to low prestige 
attached to and poor remuneration for service at the local level; 
• Unclear definitions of the distribution of functions between central government agencies and local 
authorities; 
• Intrusion of partisan politics into local government with a view, primarily to winning political 
advantage and patronage for the incumbent regime; and  
• Joggling with local government boundaries. (Republic of Ghana (c) 1991: 14). 
To remedy some of these problems, Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana provided for 5%, (later amended 
to 7.5%) national revenue sharing formula with the District Assemblies, which is the District Assemblies 
Common Fund (DACF). The District Assemblies Common Fund has, however, proven to be inadequate in 
meeting the development aspirations of the District Assemblies. Its disbursement has been characterised by 
delays and irregularity (Ayee 1992).  This situation makes revenue mobilisation from traditional sources 
imperative for the District Assemblies especially the new ones (Nkrumah 1990: 83).   
This development has made planning at the District levels very difficult Nsarkoh (1980: 80). This difficulty is 
expected to be more acute in the newly created Districts like Adaklu Anyigbe District in the Volta Region of 
Ghana, which would be expected to embark upon a more radical revenue mobilisation venture to support their 
development aspirations. 
Statement of Problem 
The District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies in Ghana are mandated by the Fourth Republican 
Constitution to ensure the overall development planning of their Districts;  District budgets must also be 
prepared for Ministry of Finance to approve. The Assemblies are to formulate and execute plans, programmes 
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and strategies for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district; 
promote and support any district activities and development that are productive and ensure that any hindrances to 
development are removed; initiate basic infrastructure development programmes and provide other essential 
services in the districts; develop, manage and improve the district’s environment and any human settlements in 
the area; responsible for maintaining security and public safety in the district in collaboration with the 
appropriate security agencies; ensure that courts are available and the people having access to them to promote 
justice in the district and perform such other functions as may be provided any other enactment.  
The accomplishment of these functions is a great challenge to all the Assemblies including even those better 
endowed with resources. The main research questions of this paper are: What are the main sources of revenue to 
the Adaklu Anyigbe District? What strategies are being adopted for revenue mobilisation? What challenges are 
confronting the revenue mobilisation effort of the District? How adequate is revenue and what impact is revenue 
so mobilised having on the development aspirations of the people? 
Aims and Objectives 
This research seeks to assess the main sources of revenue in the Adaklu Anyigbe District for carrying out it 
functions; examine the strategies adopted for revenue mobilisation in the District; evaluate the challenges facing 
revenue mobilisation efforts; assess the adequacy of the revenue mobilized and determine how the revenue so 
mobilised is used to meet the development aspirations of the people.   
Methodology    and Scope 
Thirty-five (35) questionnaires were administered to Assembly members, opinion leaders, and the management 
and the staff of the Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly to ascertain their views on revenue mobilisation the 
District. The Assembly is a small one with only thirteen (13) members and about 72 workers, making a 
population of 85 people. The sample size of 35 questionnaires was considered representative of opinion among 
management and staff of the Assembly. Documents of the District Assembly were examined and development 
projects were assessed against projections. Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) was used to analyse 
data collected from the field. 
Literature Review 
Decentralisation has become a recurring theme in political and administrative discourse   for advocates of 
administrative reform everywhere in the world (Asibuo S.K 1991: 45).  Decentralisation is probably the most 
frequently recommended structural reform to Third World Countries because “it suggests the hope of cracking 
open the blockage in an inert central bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation, giving more direct access for 
people to the government and the government to the people, stimulating the whole nation to participate in 
national development” (Philip Mawhood, 1983:1).  The popularity of the concept of decentralisation in 
development administration and the debates it has generated could be attributed to the linking of decentralisation 
with such benefits as equity, effectiveness, responsiveness and efficiency (Ayee 1992).  Some benefits of 
decentralisation have been stated by Rondinelli:  
“As societies, economies and government become more complex central control and 
decision-making become more difficult, costly and inefficient.  By reducing diseconomies of 
scale inherent in the over-concentration of decision-making in the national capital, 
decentralisation can increase the number of public goods and services – and the efficiency 
with which they are delivered – at lower cost” (Rondinelli 1981: 18).  
Despite the benefits that decentralisation is said to be capable of bringing about, attempts at decentralisation in 
the developing world, including Ghana, have brought no marked improvement in development drives (Ayee 
1990: 15).  Policy-makers and development administrators in the Third World, continue to express 
dissatisfaction with the way decentralisation policies have been implemented.  Studies, as we shall see in the 
exploration of literature, show disappointing results of attempts in most countries to decentralise planning and 
management functions.  In most cases, central government introduced heavily publicised decentralisation 
policies only to see them falter during implementation process. 
Studies further reveal a kind of double-mindedness in developing countries about the desirability of transferring 
powers and responsibilities from the central ministries to other organisations.  While local administrative 
organisations were given broad powers in some countries to perform development planning and management 
functions, adequate financial resources and qualified personnel necessary to carry out these functions were often 
withheld (Cheema & Rondinelli 1983:  297). 
Field offices of central ministries, district planning and administrative units were established in most countries in 
the developing countries, but central government officials had been reluctant or lacked the political will to assist 
them.  In their desire to minimize political conflicts and secessionist agitations, central governments discouraged 
the growth of community and non-governmental involvement in decentralisation policies (Cheema & Rondinelli 
1983: 297).  Consequently development planning and administration had remained highly centralised after 
decades of persistent attempts at decentralisation.  In some cases, authority was delegated without giving local 
organisations the flexibility to perform new functions in the ways that met local demands and needs. 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.14, 2014 
 
35 
In developing administration in the Third World, performance and impact have not often matched the goals of 
their decentralisation policies, while control over financial resources continues to suffer severe shortages in 
qualified personnel.  Local organisations have thus been largely incapacitated in their development efforts and 
exist merely to extend centrally-controlled and established priorities and are seen as solicitors of support for 
national policies (Cheema G.S. & Rondinelli 1983: 297).   
Problems of Decentralisation in Development Administration 
Diana Conyers, in probing the problems of decentralisation in development administration had a series of 
questions to ask: 
(i) What are the functional activities over which some sort of power has been transferred? 
(ii) What types of powers have been transferred with respect to each functional activity? 
(iii) To which levels or areas (for example, state, province, district, ward etc). have the powers been 
transferred? 
(iv) To whom at these levels has authority been transferred? 
(v) Finally, what legal or administrative means have been used to transfer the authority? (Diana 
Conyers 1989: 18). 
Finding answers to these questions ushers us into the problems of allocating authority, managing and 
implementing decentralised administration.  The implementation of any sort of development policy like 
decentralisation; involves major changes in structure and encounters problems arising from the relationship 
between the management of decentralised systems of administration and implementation of reforms designed to 
increase the amount of decentralisation.  The prevalence of these management and implementation problems, has 
made the rural areas by comparison with the urban centres scenes of massive poverty, unemployment, 
inadequate or virtually absent health care services and educational opportunities, poor road network, lack of 
good drinking water, low agricultural productivity, ignorance, hunger and disease   (Owusu-Ansah 1976: 19).  
Conyers had reached certain conclusions regarding the implementation and management of decentralisation 
programmes.  She noted that the amount of decentralisation is often woefully inadequate.  Secondly, 
decentralisation has failed to achieve the intended developmental objectives and thirdly decentralisation has been 
characterised by undesirable side-effects (Diana Conyers 1989: 13). 
Although some scholars are critical about the undesirable side-effects of decentralisation – regionalism, the 
pursuit of parochial interest, disparity in development standards and loyalty to local rather than to national 
leaders etc – the undesirable side-effects do not in any measure outweigh the benefits of decentralisation in 
development administration.  Despite the weaknesses of decentralisation it is a better option as compared with 
centralisation in development.  This is because centralisation as a strategy or model for development has 
marginalised decentralised organisations in development efforts in the Third World countries as a result of 
discrimination against the rural areas. 
The Ghanaian Experience of the Decentralisation in Development   Administration under the District 
Assemblies 
The “District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections” – the document that outlined the 
preliminary aspects of the PNDC’s decentralisation programme states that: 
In order to democratise state power and advance participatory democracy and collective 
decision-making at the grassroots level there is the need to set up decentralised political 
and administrative authorities with elected representatives of the people.  The 
decentralised authorities will be the bodies exercising state power as the people’s local 
government (Republic of Ghana;   (a) 1987: 1). 
In this connection, the decentralisation programme was expected to help bring about qualitative changes in the 
country’s administration, to promote effective delivery of goods and services and to facilitate the involvement of 
the people at the grassroots in decision-making.  Grassroots participation in decision-making was intended to 
ensure that experience and wisdom are tapped in the pursuit of development programmes (Ayee 1990: 46). 
To give the decentralisation programme a more meaningful push, certain measures were taken.  These measures 
include, among others, the following: 
(i) The increase in the number of districts in the country from 65 to 110 the rationale behind this 
action was not only to make the districts smaller to promote effective participatory democracy, but also 
to make them “viable and more homogenous and manageable units” (Min. of Local Government 1991: 
88).    This line of reasoning in the opinion of some scholars, including Ayee (1992: 51) is faulty 
because large units have not been proven and tested to be less effective and efficient than small ones. 
(ii) The holding of District Assembly elections in 1988/89. 
(iii)
 The enactment of PNDC Law 207 of 1988, to give backing to the District Assemblies and to 
authorise the transfer of legislative, administrative and executive powers to them.  The jurisdiction of 
the District Assemblies, much unlike the previous attempts at decentralisation, covers planning, finance, 
budgeting and security (Ayee 1992: 51).             
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(iv) The transfer of planning and budgeting processes to the district.  This measure was 
consolidated in March, 1990, by the appointment and posting to each district, of district planning and 
budgeting officers to compel ministries to actually deconcentrate their staff so as to make district 
composite budgeting a reality. (Ayee 1992: 51). 
(v) The power to pay government contracts up to the value of 250 million cedis.  In furtherance of 
this measure, District Tender Boards were established to advice the District Assemblies on the award of 
contracts.  District treasuries were simultaneously set up to take over control of budgeting from 
departments formerly under the Controller and Accountant General’s Department in Accra.  (Ayee 
1992: 51). 
(vi) To help the District Assemblies execute their functions more efficiently, 22 departments were 
decentralised (Ayee 1992: 51). 
(vii) The ceding of certain taxes previously collected by central government to the District 
Assemblies.  These ceded revenue bases meant to augment the financial resources of the District 
Assemblies include; entertainment tax; casino revenue; betting tax; gambling tax; income tax 
(registration of trade, business, profession or vocation) daily transport tax; advertisement tax.21 and 
taxes on District Weekly Lotto Operations (Ayee 1990: 49). 
The establishment of the District Assemblies and the measures taken were to ensure that local people get the 
opportunity to elect their representatives to the District Assemblies and to participate in decision-making and 
implementation processes at the district level.  This opportunity quickly whetted the appetite of the people for 
the initiation and implementation of development programmes.  Unfortunately, however, the District Assemblies 
assumed far more functions and responsibilities than the human, financial and material resources at their disposal 
could accomplish.  Most District Assemblies had to resort to the imposition of unsanctioned taxes on the people 
of their districts (Ayee 1990: 46).   
The District Assemblies were confronted with serious challenges and problems in meeting their responsibilities 
and functions. They lagged behind in fulfilling the expectations of the people with regard to development 
projects.   District Assemblies therefore remained largely ineffective in the implementation of development 
programmes that had been on their drawing boards for years, until the establishment of the District Assemblies 
Common Fund in the 1992 Constitution with the allocation of five per cent the gross national income. Article 
240 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana states that there shall be a system of local government administration 
which shall as far as practicable be decentralised. The Assemblies shall possess deliberative, legislative and 
executive powers. The District shall plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of all 
matters affecting the people within their jurisdiction with the view of ultimately achieving localisation of these 
activities (1992 Constitution of Ghana). 
The Assemblies were established to address the needs of communities within their jurisdiction and to accelerate 
development and growth. The mission of the Assemblies is to raise the living standard of the people, reduce the 
pressure on the central government and also to enable the central government perform its social and political 
aspirations (1992 Constitution). In line with the concept, one person from each electoral area within the 
Assemblies jurisdiction and member(s) of Parliament from the Constituencies within the District shall be 
member(s) of the Assembly but without a voting right. 
According to the Constitution of Ghana, the District Chief Executives (DCE's) are appointed by the president in 
consultation with the Council of State, subject to approval by two third (2/3) majority of the members of the 
Assembly. The chief executive is responsible for the day to day performance of the executive and administrative 
functions of the District Assemblies. Other members of the Assembly, which are not more than thirty percent 
(30%) of all the members of the District Assembly are appointed by the President in consultation with the 
traditional authorities and other interest groups in the District (1992 Constitution of Ghana). The Assemblies 
have been assigned functions and responsibilities more than it was in the traditional local government functions. 
This has been emphasized by Act 462 Section 10 and Article 245 of the 1992 Constitution which states the 
functions of the Districts Assemblies are as follows: 
• To ensure the overall development of the District by preparing district developmental plans for approval 
by the National Development Commission. 
• Levying and collection of taxes, rates fees and fines 
• To promote and support any district activities and development that is reproductive and ensures that any 
hindrances to these are stopped. 
• Organization and maintenance of law, order, peace and security in the District. 
• To perform any other function that may be conferred on them by the Government. 
The Concept of Decentralisation  
The climate of opinion in which liberal economists, as well as Marxist thinkers were urging the virtue of 
centralised planning mechanism as the key to rapid development is fast fading into oblivion (Mawhood 1987: 
13). This state of affairs is due principally to the growing dissatisfaction over the failure of national or central 
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planning and investment to produce results in development schemes in the Third World in the 1960’s and the 
new grounds decentralisation is believed to have broken or to be capable of breaking (Mawhood 1987:  13).     
Hence decentralisation of the machinery of government has been regarded as a panacea for solving socio-
economic woes of developing countries (Asibuo   1991:  45).      
The wealth of literature available on decentralisation of administration and development is, therefore, worthy of 
critical review.  This review of literature concentrates on empirical works available and relevant to 
decentralisation and development in general with particular emphasis on Third World Countries and Ghana.  
Studies on Decentralisation in some African Countries  
In his case study of decentralisation experience in the 1970’s and the 1980’s of Zambia, Sudan and Nigeria, 
Asibuo (1991), revealed that insufficient political will undermined the effectiveness of the implementation of 
decentralisation programmes.  Secondly, there was inadequate understanding of the provisions of the reforms 
and the new roles expected of both councillors and staff.  This situation, Asibuo (1991) noted, was due to lack of 
adequate education on the real meaning and fundamental philosophy of decentralisation by the different actors in 
the drama of implementation of decentralisation programmes at each administrative level.  He concluded that 
numerous functions and responsibilities were transferred to the local authorities in each of the three countries 
without the transfer of corresponding measures of financial, human and material resources.  Consequently even 
though local autonomy and democracy were the objectives set in the restructuring processes of the three 
countries, they could not be realised.  In contrast, centralisation of power was enhanced (Asibuo 1991: 45).      
Humes (1973: 21) observed that;  
‘The basic weakness of decentralised local institutions as promoters 
of economic development has been the lack of sufficient functions, 
funds and functionaries to undertake the capital development so 
vital to economic prosperity’  
Apart from the emphasis on finance, (Humes 1973: 21) stressed management problems.  He stated in a study he 
conducted on Nigeria that the calibre of the membership of local councils had been generally low, too few 
qualified men were available for office and too many incumbent local government officials were illiterate and 
corrupt, hence the ineffectiveness in the discharge of their duties.        
Studies on Financial Aspects of Decentralisation in Ghana 
There are empirical studies on the problems of decentralisation and development in Ghana with emphasis on 
lack of sources of financing development projects.  Commenting on the causes of poor performance of local 
government councils in Ghana, Nkrumah (1990: 83)   asserted that the absence of a civic sense of responsibility 
among the local population has made it difficult for local authorities to collect rates, hence their over-dependence 
on central government grants-in-aid which are grossly inadequate, irregular and often late in coming.  Nkrumah 
argued that this chronic financial problem of local authorities could be solved through direct revenue-sharing 
with the central government on specified percentage basis  
Nsarkoh (1980: 80) pointed out that under the Busia regime, even though local government councils had power 
to generate revenue for the effective discharge of their duties and responsibilities, they could not do so. Nsarkoh 
(1977: 28) concluded that available sources of revenue offered plenty of scope for expansion provided that the 
councils would apply themselves to the organisation of revenue collection as a matter of paramount importance 
by eliminating dishonest and corrupt tax collectors  
 In support of Nsarkoh’s view is the study Dankyi (1987) who investigated the extent and effects of financial 
problems facing local government councils in Ghana.  Dankyi (1987) analysed local authority budget in the 
allocation of resources and examined the existing and possible new sources of revenue for local government 
units and came to the same conclusion as Nsarkoh (1977: 28). 
Dzakpasu (1976) on the performance of the Dzodze Local Council between 1966 and 1969 disclosed that 
inadequate financial capacity had been the major limitation on the development efforts of the Council. In a 
comparative study of the financial resources of some District Assemblies in five regions of Ghana (Ayee 1990: 
46), stated that the District Assemblies in Ghana lacked the necessary revenue to cope with the numerous 
functions conferred on them by the Local Government Law 1988 (PNDC Law 207).  Ayee (1990: 46) argued 
that some District Assemblies have as a result, resorted to the imposition of new and unsanctioned taxes on the 
people.  
 Personnel Aspects of Decentralisation in Ghana  
Apart from financial problems in the implementation of decentralisation policies, another work has touched on 
personnel and administrative problems.  In her study entitled “Administrative Capabilities of District Councils” 
for instance, Pepra-Omani (1986) argued that one of the most important factors which have contributed to low 
productivity of local authorities had been lack of qualified personnel to man the administration at the district 
level.  She concluded that if local government bodies are to make any meaningful impact in their bid to promote 
development, then training of manpower should be given serious attention.  
Relationship between Decentralisation and Development  
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Development, in this study is conceived of as a multi-dimensional process involving major changes in social 
structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth,  reduction 
of inequality,   eradication of absolute poverty,   provision of employment and the basic necessities of life – 
water, food, clothing and shelter – without which life becomes impossible.  Development is also characterised by 
a general movement away from those conditions of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory towards a situation or 
condition regarded as materially and spiritually better (Todaro Michael P 1985:  85). 
In concrete terms, development involves such social goals as improved conditions of health and nutrition, 
augmented educational opportunities, expanded social welfare services and increased mobility, as well as such 
economic ones like raised incomes, higher agricultural production and increased employment opportunities 
Owusu-Ansah (1976: 19).  
Attempts to decentralise administrative systems are seldom initiated solely for developmental reasons.  This is 
because decentralisation is fundamentally a political process in the sense that it involves a change in the 
distribution of power and influence.  For example, if local government units are dominated by opposition 
political groups in a multi-party system or if there is any risk of political secession Diana Conyers (1989: 15). 
It therefore becomes necessary to examine not only the developmental aspect of decentralisation but also its 
political role and dimension which are often very complex.  For example, it is important to recognise the 
difference between “top-down”   decentralisation, which is initiated at the national level of government and 
consists of the transfer of some of the powers and authority of the central government and the “bottom-up” 
decentralisation where the major initiative comes from local pressure groups seeking greater power and 
participation Diana   Conyers (1989: 16). 
Most of the recent decentralisation programmes in Africa (including the District Assemblies in Ghana) belong to 
the former category, since they were initiated at the national level.  The division of Nigeria into states after the 
Biafran war of 1966/67 and the devolution of powers to the provinces in Southern Sudan are examples of 
“bottom-up” deconcentration (Diana Conyers 1989: 15). 
Furthermore, since no government is likely to give away power willingly without good reason, one finds that 
“top-down” decentralisation programmes inevitably have some sort of ulterior political motives of a centralising 
nature in the sense that they are intended to strengthen, rather than weaken the role of central government (Diana 
Conyers 1989:16). A good example, of this is the appointment of the District Chief Executives by the 
government as the Chief Executive Officers of a largely elected body of representatives as the District Assembly 
in Ghana (Republic of Ghana (b) 1988: 6). 
Data Presentation and Analysis 
Sources of Revenue 
The Local Government Act, (Act 462) of 1993 outlines the sources of revenue to the Metropolitan, Municipal 
and District Assemblies, from which the Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly also derives its revenue. These are: 
• The Traditional Local Revenue Source, 
• Grant from the Central Government in the form of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF)  
Traditional Local Sources of Revenue 
The traditional sources of revenue are funds locally generated by the Assembly itself.  These sources of revenue 
include licences, rates, fees, fines and charges,  rents and income from investment. 
Licences 
The Assembly is empowered to regulate the conduct of certain business for which licences or permits are 
required from the Assembly.  For example dog licences, building and road construction licences and building 
permits are determined by the District Assembly, as a source of revenue. 
Table 1: Revenue Performance for Licences for 2005 – 2008 
Year  Estimate ¢ Actual ¢ Variance ¢ % 
2005 414,000,000 275,914,560 138,088,540 66.65 
2006 228,550,000 149,701,166 788,488,340 19.39 
2007 119,789,000 167,440,000 118,115,150 2.40 
2008 857,640 107,719 749,210 12.55 
Total  763,196,640 593,163,445 1,045,441,240 100 
Source: Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly Trial Balance 
Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly Budget Statement 
 Table 1, shows the Assembly’s actual revenue for Licences fell short of its projections.  For instance, in 2005 
financial year, the Assembly collected ¢ 275,914,560 as revenue, representing only 66.65% of the estimated 
revenue of ¢414,000,000 for that year.  In 2006 the actual revenue collected amounted to ¢ 149,701,166, 
representing only 19.39% of the estimated amount of ¢ 228,550,500.  Revenue for 2007 on the other hand was         
¢ 16,744,000 representing 1.4% out of an estimated amount of ¢ 119,789,500.  The estimated revenue for 2008 
(as shown in Table 1) was ¢ 857,640 but only ¢107,719 representing 12.56% of the target was collected at the 
end of the year.  
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The unreliable and unpredictable nature of revenue from these sources as pointed out by Nkrumah (1990) and 
Ayee (1990) rendered planning of development projects very difficult.  This situation was on account of the fact 
that actual revenues collected from these sources were for below projected targets. 
Fees Charges and Fines 
Fees and fines are charges on beneficiaries of services rendered by the Assembly.  Some of the services included 
the cleaning of drains, streets and the provision of school buildings among others.  In respect of other services 
however fees of various kinds were charged.  For example court/spot fines, lorry park tools, slaughterhouse and 
conservancy fees were charged during the period under review. Table 2 is the Assembly’s revenue performance 
for fees and fines for the period. 
Table 2: Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly Revenue Performance For Fees and Fines for 2005 – 2008 
Year Estimate(¢) Actual Variance(¢) % 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
136600 
666418000 
1703200 
2803690 
460002 
6641822 
118342 
547623 
905997 
26177 
522857 
2256066 
33.68 
25.2 
21.59 
19.53 
Total 6,710,614,90 7,767,789 3,11097 100 
           Source:  The Assembly’s Trial Balances 
The Assembly’s Budget Statement 
Table 2 shows that the Assembly has been realising some revenue from fees and fines.  However, they had never 
been able to exceed their target for the period under study.  For example in 2005 the revenue collected was           
¢ 460,002 out of ¢ 136,600 representing 33.68%.  In 2005 and 2006 court fines and penalties alone accounted for 
18.68% and 26.10% respectively of the total amount realised from fees and fines.   
Rates  
The Assembly has authority to levy rates on immovable property, possessions of individuals throughout the 
District. Special rates for special project in the District are also levied.  The Assembly determined the amount it 
would levy for the various projects by a resolution of members through a ‘Rate Notice and Rate Fixing 
Resolution’ of the Assembly.  This document spelt out the various taxes and the amount the Assembly was to 
collect within each financial year for development projects and recurrent expenditure.  There are three different 
kinds of rates levied by the Assembly.  These are: basic rates, property rates and special rates 
Table 3: Basic Rate Revenue Collection for 2005 – 2008 
Year Estimate (¢) Actual (¢) Variance (¢) %  
 
 
 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2,000,000 
1500,000 
1500,000 
2,000,000 
9,84500 
412,800 
643874 
2150,000 
(1,015500) 
(1087200) 
(8256126) 
150,000 
49.2 
27.5 
46.3 
107.5 
Total                             7000000                 4191174              2808826              230 
Source: Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly Budget 
Apart from 2002 when the Assembly exceeded its estimated amount of basic rates by 150,000 representing 
107.5% of the budgeted amount, the remaining years saw actual revenue figures falling far short of their 
estimated figures.  In 2005, for example, the Assembly collected a total of ¢ 984,500 out of the estimated 
¢2,000,000 for the year representing only 49.2% of the estimated target.  In 2006, it collected ¢412,000 as actual 
revenue, representing 27.5% of the estimated amount of ¢1,500,000.  In 2007 though there was an increment as 
compared to the previous years, the performance was still not encouraging compared to the estimate for the year.  
The analysis indicated a very unstable financial performance of the Assembly as far as basic rates were 
concerned.  Even the estimated amounts for all the years seemed not to follow any consistent pattern. This 
suggested that the Assembly had no specific scientific basis for making its estimates.   
Special Rate 
Apart from basic rates, and property rates, the Assembly levies special rates, which is a rate levied for the 
purpose of a specified project approved by Assembly for a particular electoral area.  In practice, these rates had 
almost always been levied at the instance of towns / villages and area   communities by resolution. The Adaklu 
Anyigbe District Assembly just like all other newly created  District Assemblies lack adequate revenue.   
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Miscellaneous 
These are unspecified receipts that are part of revenue mobilised but cannot be appropriately grouped under any 
significant revenue head. These sources include revenue from District Weekly Lotto and unspecified receipt. 
Apart from the Assembly’s own efforts at mobilizing funds locally, The government also transferred funds to 
support their financial plans. 
District Assemblies Common Fund 
The District Assembly Common Fund was established by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The District 
Assembly Common Fund Act 455 was passed by Parliament on 6th July, 1993.  The Act provided for the District 
Assembly Common Fund, its Administrator, the function of the Administrator and other related issues, with the 
provision that ‘Parliament shall annually make provision for the allocation of not less than 7.5% on the total 
revenue of Ghana to the District Assemblies for development and the amount shall be paid in to the D.A.C.F in 
quarterly instalment.’ 
In 2006 and 2007 a total ¢140,500,000 and ¢260,800,000 of the Common Fund was received respectively. The 
2007 figure representing an increase of 45.3% over what was received in 2006 (Adaklu Anyigbe Budget 
Statements 2006 and 2007).   From the records, the Assembly was not able to mobilize enough revenue this 
situation put so much pressure on the District Assemblies Common Fund for virtually every development project 
undertaken during the period. 
Problems Faced During Revenue Mobilization 
The Assembly faced many challenges in its revenue mobilisation efforts. Some of the challenges were planning; 
monitoring and control of revenue collectors and the co-coordination of sources of revenue. Tabulated below are 
the various problems faced in the Assembly’s revenue mobilization efforts as outlined by the Respondents. 
                      Table 4: Problems faced during revenue mobilization 
No. Responses Frequency % 
1 Problem of planning 15 42.8 
2 Problem of co-coordinating 10 28.5 
3 Problem of controlling 10 28.5 
4 Any other 0 0 
 Total 35 100 
Source: Field survey, June, 2009. 
Represented below is the graphical illustration of the above information. 
• Figure 1:  Problems faced during revenue mobilization 
 
Source: Field Data, June 2009  
The Degree of Involvement of Rate Payers in Fixing Rates: 
Assembly members are the legitimate representatives of the people in the District. The rates were fixed by the 
Assembly on their behalf purportedly after consulting their electorates. The perception among the respondents 
was that they were not consulted by their representatives in the determination of the rates levied by the 
Assembly.                             
Table 5: The perception of the degree of involvement of rate payers in fixing rates: 
No. Responses Frequency % 
1 Fully involved 0 0 
2 Partially involved 1 2.8 
3 Not involved 34 97.2 
Total  35 100 
Source: Field Survey June, 2009. 
From Table 5, the perception that Assembly members did not involve their electorates in fixing rates was 97.2 
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%. The Assembly was perceived to have neglected rate payers in the determination of rates.  
Figure 2: The degree of involvement of rate payers in fixing rates: 
 
Degree of Rate Payers Involvement in Rate 
Fixing Process
Fully involved
Partially involved
Not involved
 
Source: Field Data, June 2009.  
Logistics for Revenue Mobilization: 
The adequacy of resources to support the operations of District Assemblies has always be of great concern to 
many proponents local governance and challenges are even more daunting in newly created Assemblies like the 
Adaklu- Anyigbe District Assembly To asses the adequacy of logistics at the Assembly, the researchers 
investigated the number of cars and computers, which are key resources in revenue mobilization processes  
available to the revenue mobilization team at the Assembly and tabulated below are the various responses. 
4.5 Impact of Revenue Mobilised on Society 
Table 6 Development Projects Financed through Mobilised Revenue. 
Type of Project Cost of Project Remarks 
(1) Construction of six market 
buildings at Kpetoe, Ziope, 
Adaklu Have and Adaklu 
Xelekpe 
Type of Project 
 
¢3750000 
 
 
 
Cost of Project 
Completed. Financed from 2007 
revenue mobilized 
 
 
 
Remarks  
(2) Construction of two story 
classroom Block office and 
store (phase 1) at Adaklu 
Adaklu Abuadi 
¢48,562,900 Completed and in use 
(3) Purchase of 16 computers for 
the District Assembly and 12 
other for Agotime Secondary 
school  
¢150,000,000 Delivered and in use.   
 
(4) Establishment of Day Care 
Centre at Adaklu Kpatove  
¢170,000,000 Completed E.U. project, 
Assembly Construction 15% of 
the cost 
(5) Construction of Police Station 
at Kpetoe 
¢349,000,000 On going at roofing stage 
(6) Construction of office for 
Ziope Area Council Ziope 
¢289,000,000 Completed and in use 
Source:  Monitoring Team Report (2006) Adaklu Anyigbe 2007 Supplementary 
Budget 
Table 6 Depicts the development projects carried out by the Assembly during the period under study. 
 
Conclusion  
The Adaklu Anyigbe District Assembly is confronted with great challenges as far as revenue mobilisation is 
concerned. The Assembly was unable to meet its revenue targets for four consecutive years – from 2004 to 2008. 
Annual estimates for the period had always fallen short of actual revenue mobilised or received. The District 
Assembly Common Fund was the main source of sustainable income, but it was characterised by undue delays 
and irregularity and the quantum was often below what was expected. This affected development planning on a 
sustainable basis in the District. Secondly, logistics required for revenue mobilisation was inadequate. 
 
Recommendations   
The study recommends that the Assembly should improve its basis for establishing estimated revenue. In 
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determining such estimates the Assembly should be guided by reliable statistical data.  The Management should 
involve rate payers in fixing rates, in order to promote consensus and a better commitment to the civic 
responsibility of paying rates. 
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